Introduction
For many companies, their salesforce is the most important Marketing tool on the Interface between the Company and its customers. Especially for industrial goods firms, personal selling often is the only function generating sales. Therefore, the proper design of compensation and monitoring Systems to control the salesforce is of vital interest for many companies. This is no easy task since sales managers have to combine a vast number of different control Clements, such as commission rates, intensity of supervision, and different control bases, which might affect the salespeople's behavior differently depending on their combination (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992, p. 12) . Consequently, the combination of Single control elements to holistic governance structures is a complex issue. This problem becomes even more difficult against the background of turbulent and changing business environments (Babakus et al. 1996) .
Sales managers might try to solve this by looking for "best practices" or industry Standards.
Though commercial studies performed by e.g. Dartnell reveal differences in the use of control elements (Heide 1994) , they only report averages of Single elements, not predominant use of governance structures as combinations of elements. Other shortcomings are the substantial variance even within Industries and the lack of explanation for why companies use certain control elements or Systems. Recent theoretical approaches such as agency theory and transaction cost analysis might remedy this, since they identify behavior-based and outcome-based control Systems as polar managerial strategies and also suggest circumstances under which they are appropriate (Eisenhardt 1989) . Since these extreme control approaches first have been applied to the salesforce control issue by Anderson and Oliver (1987) , a few empirical tests of the consequences (like Job satisfaction, Performance) of salesforce control Systems have been undertaken (Cravens et al. 1993; Oliver and Anderson 1994; Oliver and Anderson 1995, Challagalla and Shervani 1996) . However, no attempt to investigate the antecedents of salesforce control Systems has been made so far. This paper aims to fill this gap through an empirical test of how certain constructs identified by the above mentioned approaches affect the design of control Systems along the continuum anchored by outcome-based and behavior-based management strategies.
The article is organized as follows. The first section serves to derive a set of hypotheses. In the second section relevant research on salesforce control Systems is shortly reviewed. In order to test the hypotheses, a mail survey among German chief sales executives has been conducted. The research design, especially variable operationalizations are reported in the third section.
Following this, the results of the empirical test are reported and discussed (sections 4 and 5). The paper conciudes with study limitations, management implications and directions for further research (section 6).
Research Framework and Hypotheses
Few theoretical approaches have influenced research on management and control as much as agency theory and transaction cost analysis. These frameworks have been applied to marketing issues such as Channel coordination and control, franchising, make-or-buy decisions, and sales management (for a review see Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992) . In sales management, agency theory has been applied to the question of salary vs. commission compensation (Basu et al. 1985; Lal and Srinivasan 1993) , while transaction cost analysis has been used to explain the use of direct salesforces vs. manufacturer representatives (Anderson 1985) and the proportion of salary to total compensation (John and Weitz 1989) .
Agency theory is concemed with the analysis and optimal design of contracts between principals and agents to whom the principals delegate decision-making authority. In general, agency theory assumes uncertain sales environments and Information costs that make it difficult to monitor the agent's behavior perfectly. Another central premise is that principals and agents pursue divergent goals and have different risk attitudes. Against this background, agencytheoretical models focus on designing compensation schemes and control Systems that realign the incentives of both parties so that they aim at the same outcome ("incentive compatibility").
Generally, firms have two contrasting choices. On the one side, the principal can purchase information about the agents* input and reward certain behavior ("behavior control"). On the other side, firms can measure Outputs and hold the agents responsible for them ("outcome control"). While the second choice shifts risk from the principal to the agent, the opposite is true for the first choice. For more details, see Eisenhardt (1985) .
Based on a more general model by Holmström (1979) , Basu et al. (1985) applied agency theory to derive optimal compensation contracts for homogeneous salesforces in the sense of Proportion of total compensation that should be fixed (equivalent to behavior control) versus the Proportion that should be variable (outcome control). Comparative statics indicate that higher environmental uncertainty or sales volatility, sales managers* willingness to take risk and salespeople's risk aversion should lead to higher percentages of fixed salary (i.e. more behavior control). This percentage should also be higher when measuring inputs is less expensive and more accurate than measuring Outputs. If the salespeople are more effective, agency theory predicts lower proportions of salary to total compensation, while higher minimum Utility requirements should be accounted for with higher percentages of fixed salary (for a recent review of the Basu et al. model and extensions see Coughlan 1993; Albers 1996) . If we treat higher proportions of salary as equivalent to behavior control, we arrive at the hypotheses given in Table 1. [ Table 1 about here] Transaction cost analysis (TCA) is based on Coase's article on the Theory of the Firm (1937) and was later refined and further developed to a theoretical framework by Williamson (1981 Williamson ( , 1985 . TCA is focussing on whether transactions should be carried out within a Company or through market contracting outside the "boundaries of a firm". This theory especially aims at identifying cost efficient organizational Solutions.
Market contracting (or outcome control) is generally considered to be more cost efficient than integrating transactions (i.e. behavior control). Only in the case of high uncertainty, idiosyncratic (i.e. transaction specific) assets, or ffequent transactions, the market becomes inefficient. In those cases, integrating transactions (using behavior control) is more appropriate.
Contrary to agency theory, TCA predicts that environmental uncertainty or sales volatility per se does not have an impact on the use of either outcome or behavior control. Only if a firm experiences high uncertainty and employs salespeople with considerable transaction specific assets, it should deviate from the 'default' Option of outcome control and direct its salesforce via behavior control. As in agency theory, TCA hypothesizes that companies should apply outcome control if accurate outcome measures are readily available. These hypotheses are also shown in Table 1 . For more details see Williamson (1981 Williamson ( ,1985 , Anderson (1985) , Eisenhardt (1989) , and John and Weitz (1989) 
Ouchi's organizational approach (Ouchi 1979) states that goal conflicts between agents and principals can also be overcome by socialization. The measurement of either behavior, outcome, or both may be impossible (see Eisenhardt 1985) . In the latter case, neither outcome nor behavior control may be appropriate, but "clan control" by socialization, a third type of control system. Since clans as control type are still poorly understood (Anderson and Oliver 1987) , they are not considered in this paper.
Ouchi's approach acknowledges, as does agency theory and TCA, that behavior control becomes more appropriate when outcome measures are costly or inaccurate. Specific to this ap proach is, that Ouchi recommends to use behavior control Systems if the transformation process between salespeople's inputs and the outcome of the selling process is known (Ouchi 1979 ).
Summary
The conclusions drawn from agency theory, TCA, and Ouchi's organizational approach are summarized and presented in Table 1 . As in Anderson and Oliver s (1987) paper, the variables are organized as environmental, Company, and salespeople variables. We did not consider all of their hypotheses (e.g. we excluded clans as a control type) and introduced new hypotheses on the impact of minimum Utility requirement and transaction specific assets of salespeople. Prior to testing these hypotheses on a ffesh data set, we shortly review the empirical literature on control system practices among companies.
Previous Empirical Research
To date, four published studies have focussed on consequences of behavior-based versus outcome-based salesforce control Systems at the organizational or individual level. Oliver and Anderson (1995) also examined the properties of control Systems and report that 39% of the sample represent hybrid control philosophies, i.e. control Systems not being normatively correct.
Of further internst for our paper are the different approaches to operationalize and measure behavior and outcome control. Cravens et al. (1993) obtained the surprising result that salesforce compensation is independent from field sales management control (i.e. monitoring and direction). Therefore, these authors treated them as distinct control dimensions to test their effect on consequences such as salesforce characteristics, Performance, and effectiveness. Oliver and Anderson (1994) factor analyze 23 control system measures and report six independent factors that are combined as causal or formative indicators of the control System. In contrast to this approach, Challagalla and Shervani (1996) distinguish between measures of behavior and outcome control. They report that even behavior control does not represent a unidimensional construct, but is made up by 'activity control' and 'capability control* as separate dimensions.
From this review we can conclude that there is no uniform approach to measure the extent of behavior versus outcome control.
Note also that none of the four studies focuses on the antecedents of salesforce control systems. So we have to refer to studies mostly focussing on compensation as a Single element of the control System. Major contributions are from John and Weitz (1989) , Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) , Lal, Outland, and Staelin (1994) , and Joseph and Kalwani (1995) . As a review and additional data by Krafft, Lal, and Albers (1996) reveal, the findings on the impact of 'uncertainty' are mixed, while 'size of the salesforce* shows effects contrary to the hypothesis.
Support is provided on the effects of 'knowledge of the transformation process' and 'measurability of outcome', while the hypothesis on 'measurability of behavior* is not supported. To the best of our knowledge, *management's willingness to assume risk' has never been investigated so far.
Joseph and Kalwani report a supporting positive effect of salespeople's risk aversion on the percentage of salary. Coughlan and Narasimhan as well as Krafft, Lal, and Albers find some support for the minimum Utility required by salespeople. While the latter authors also report supporting findings on the impact of effectiveness, the former authors find significant positive as well as negative effects. Non-significant findings are reported for the impact of transaction specifity both in John and Weitz* and Krafft, Lal, and Albers' paper.
Thus, the empirical studies on salesforce compensation tend to support some of the hypotheses stated in the previous section. However, we still have to bear in mind that these studies are focussing on compensation as one control system dement and "were not collected with the specific intent of identifying outcome and behavior control philosophies" (Anderson and Oliver 1987, p. 85) . We therefore want to contribute to further understanding of why companies select certain control philosophies.
Research Design and Measures

Setting and Sample
To test the hypotheses described in section 1, we mailed a questionnaire to 1,099 chief sales executives of German salesforces. This seems appropriate since firms mostly use only one control system for the whole salesforce. Thus, we seek to capture the perceptions of chief sales executives who are involved in the design of salesforce control Systems. The questionnaire was developed and pretested with 10 top sales executives. Several efforts were made to solicit the response of the chief sales executives. The intial mailing was followed up by a second mailing after 4-6 weeks. Further efforts to improve the response rate were made through a contact by fax and promise of sharing the results of our study. The survey was completed about twelve weeks after the first mailing and resulted in a response rate of about 25%. Of the 270 responding firms, 61 firms used only manufacturer representatives, 173 used a direct salesforce and 36 used reps and direct salespeople. A comparison of our sample with other German studies is reported in Table 2 and shows that our data set corresponds to the average annual sales, salesforce size, age, tenure, total pay, and percentage of fixed salary.
[ Table 2 about here] Dependent Variables Anderson and Oliver (1987) presented a behavior versus outcome salesforce control continuum based on methods of monitoring, evaluating, directing, and compensating salespeople's inputs and results. We decided to follow Cravens et al. (1993) and use direct measures of single control Clements. We include the fixed salary percentage (FIXPERC) as a measure of compensation control, while direction and supervision are assessed using span of control (SPANCTRL) and the extent of reporting (REPORT). The latter variable and the Performance evaluation scale (EV ALU ATE) as the fourth component were computed by weighting different dummy variables on categories of reports and evaluation criteria. For more details see Table A -l in the Appendix.
Following Oliver and Anderson (1994) , we generale a behavior-control index. Though the above mentioned four components are positively correlated with each other, the internal consistency of the index is very modest (Cronbach's a = 0.53). Similar findings have been reported by both Cravens et al. (1993) and Oliver and Anderson (1994) and clearly show that some managers design control Systems in which some Clements are not in balance with the overall control system (so-called hybrid Systems). Nevertheless, we compute a behavior-control index by adding the z-values of all four control system Clements and dividing the sum by 4. This index represents a "formative indicator" (see Bollen and Lennox 1991 and the review in Oliver and Anderson 1994) with higher (lower) scores representing a rather behavior (outcome)-based control system. The reasoning behind this overall index is that salespeople face "a control system that is the totality of its parts" (Oliver and Anderson 1994, p. 59) . Of 270 observations, 242 respondents answered on all four questions. These cases were used for further analyses.
Due to the modest internal consistency of this index, we decided to classify all observations into two subsamples with companies applying normatively correct Systems versus hybrid control systems. Again we used the standardized scores for the four control system components. While consistent positive (negative) z-scores indicate a behavior (outcome)-based orientation, positive and negative scores for one Observation point to the fact that a hybrid system is applied. Z-scores between -0.5 and 0.5 were treated as being neither behavior-nor outcome-oriented. Assume for example that a Company reveals the following z-scores for the control system components: 1.4 (ZFKPERC), -0.3 (ZEVALUAT), 0.8 (ZREPORT), and -1.2 (ZSPANCTR). The components 'percentage of salary' and 'reporting' indicate a behavior-based system, while the score on 'span of control' let us expect an outcome-oriented system. Because of its low z-score, 'performance evaluation' did not serve as Classification criteria for this Observation. The Observation described above represents a hybrid control system, since two components indicate a behavior-based system, while the 'span of control' score indicates an outcome-based control system. Therefoie, this Observation is assigned cell 2 (behavior control); 1 (outcome control). All observations were classified in the same way and assigned to cells of the following matrix:
[ Table 3 Observations assigned to the first group are coded as '0', while the second group is coded as T.
This binary variable is treated as an additional dependent variable in a logistic regression in order to validate or qualify results obtained from the regression on the behavior-control index.
Differences between findings from the analyses of the index and the 0/1 variable of normatively correct observations can also be interpreted as the differences of hybrid versus coherent control Systems.
Independent Variables
In the following, we shortly describe the operationalizations of the independent variables identified in section 1. For more details see Table A -2 in the Appendix.
Environment
Uncertainty. This construct has been approached through a variety of measures in the literature, where each measure captures a somewhat different dimension of the overall construct.
In our study we include items used in previous studies but also measure the number of customers per salesperson to capture the possibility of avoiding uncertainty through diversification of the selling effort (Porter 1980) . A confirmatory factor analysis of these items results in three different factors: environmental uncertainty, sales volatility and diversification of risk.
Company Variables
Size ofthe salesforce. This is directly measured in terms of the number of salespeople.
Managements willingness to assume risk. The risk attitude of sales managers is measured by adapting a lottery technique used by Oliver and Weitz (1991) and Ross (1991) . The sales managers are asked to compare a Situation in which they are offered to manage either a business unit with a certain outcome X or a new division with innovative products and an equally likely outcome of e.g. DM 600,000 or DM 900,000. The Chief sales executives are then asked to specify a certain amount X which they feel is equivalent to the uncertain outcomes of either DM 600,000 or DM 900,000. All respondents with amounts less than DM 750,000 are considered risk averse, while amounts above DM 750,000 indicate a risk seeking attitude. This scale seems preferable to Single item measures as used in Cravens et al. (1993) . Note also that meta analyses indicate that risk measures based on natural situations and lotteries are superior to other scales (see MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986, pp. 196 ff. and 216 ff.) .
Measurability of outcome.
This construct is measured through a three-item agree/disagree scale. While two items are adapted from Anderson (1985) , one new item is added. It measures the number of factors beyond the control of salespeople that have an impact on their outcome. In addition, we used a single-item measure capturing costs of Output measurement as perceived by the sales executive, based on arguments from Eisenhardt (1985) and Anderson and Oliver (1987) .
Measurability of behavior.
This construct is measured through a four-item agree/disagree scale as in John and Weitz (1989) . We complement this scale by a single-item agree/disagree measure on whether exact activity reports are available.
Knowledge of transformation process. As Eisenhardt (1985 Eisenhardt ( , 1988 proposed we use a twoitem agree/disagree scale on the complexity of products as a proxy negatively related to this construct. We also measure this construct by the time it takes to assimilate new hires -a similar indicator has been applied by Jaworski, Stathakopoulus, and Krishnan (1993) in a survey on marketing managers. This indicator is expected to be negatively related to the construct, too. As a third measure, we consider the importance of routine activities in the selling process as an indicator positively related to the construct. In detail, travel time is treated as routine, while sales calls are considered as non-standard activities. Our measure of routine activities is derived by subtracting the percentage of time for sales calls from the percentage of traveling time (as a percentage of total effort).
Salespeople Variables
Transaction specifity. To measure this construct we choose a two-stage approach. First, we ask the sales executive to specify the total costs for training new salespeople. Secondly, the sales executives are asked to specify how much time of this training is needed for acquiring customer specific know-how, general selling skills etc. The indicator for transaction specifity is then derived by multiplying the total costs with the percentage of customer specific know-how.
Salespeople's risk aversion, We assess the risk aversion of salespersons in a very similar way to the construct 'management's willingness to assume risk'. The sales managers are asked to assume that they are an average salesperson of their salesforce. Again, a lottery technique is applied. We describe a scenario in which a typical salesperson's income (commissions only) varies between e.g. DM 80K and DM 120K (the expected high and low income is suited to each subindustry's Standard). The high and low eamings are described as being equally likely. We then present the informants with a choice of trading these risky incomes for a guaranteed annual salary. The respondents are then asked to specify a salary they feel is equivalent to the risky commissions only income of either DM 80K or DM 120K. All responses with amounts less than DM 100K are considered risk averse, while amounts above DM 100K indicate a risk seeking attitude.
Effectiveness. This construct is measured through average tenure, age, and average selling experience. While the latter is a new indicator, the first two variables already have been proposed and applied similarly by Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) .
Minimum Utility requirement.
We measure this through a weighted index of education as an indicator. This variable has been applied by Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) .
Estimation
All in all we use 18 variables as independent variables. We eliminate all cases with missing values on at least one variable (casewise deletion). This reduces our behavior control index (BCI) dataset from 242 to 172 cases and the sample of normatively correct Systems from 153 to 104.
Prior to analyzing the remaining sample, we check for whether the assumptions of multiple regression analysis are met. A preliminary iegression run and pairwise deletion of 'uncertainty' and 'uncertainty*transaction specifity' denotes that the interaction term is multicollinear. After deletion of the interaction term, we observe mild collinearity in the correlation matrix of the independent variables. With the exception of 'assimilation of new hires' and 'transaction specifity' (r = 0.57), all correlations are < 0.5. By analyzing residual plots, partial regression plots, normal probability plots, and running a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we examined the appropriateness of Table 4 .
[ Table 4 about here] 5. Discussion of Results Table 4 repeats the hypotheses derived in section 1, and presents the coefficients of both models. Positive signs imply a higher behavior-control index (linear regression) or probability of applying a normatively correct behavior-control System. Negative coefficients imply a more outcome-oriented control system. In this section, which is first organized by categories of variables, we mostly refer to results obtained from the multiple linear regression on the BCI.
Results from logistic regression serve as Validation or for qualifying the evidence from the BCI regression. At the end of this section, we will discuss how useful Single theoretical approaches or categories of variables are in explaining the design of salesforce control Systems.
Environment
Uncertainty. Two out of three measures of this construct, namely environmental uncertainty and customers per salesperson show significant effects in the hypothesized direction. Thus, uncertainty has a positive impact on the use of behavior control Systems.
Company Variables
Size of the salesforce. Contrary to expectations, the number of salespeople is negatively related to the extent of applying a behavior-based control system. This finding contradicts our hypothesis derived from TCA, but Supports Shapiro's (1977) argument, that larger organizations are more difficult to control. Additionally, John and Weitz (1989, p. 9 ) report a significant negative impact on the role of salary. We therefore reject this hypothesis.
Management's willingness to assume risk. While the coefficient of this variable is not significantly related to the BCI, the positive coefficient from our logistic regression model supports our hypothesis. Since the signs of this construct are conflicting in the logistic regression and the BCI model, we do not find unambiguous Support for this hypothesis. But we conclude, that the risk attitude of sales managers plays a significant role in designing control Systems, if we restrict ourselves to organizations applying normatively correct control Systems. To the best of our knowledge, this construct has never been tested before, so we cannot report additional findings from other studies.
Measurability ofoutcome. The variable Output inadequate as measure of Performance' has a positive impact on the BCI and thereby supports our hypothesis derived from both Agency theory, TCA and Ouchi's approach. We also find a significant positive sign of our second measure 'costs of Output measurement', thereby supporüng the hypothesis derived from Agency theory. Analogous supporting findings in Anderson (1985) and John and Weitz (1989) emphasize the role of this construct in designing salesforce control Systems.
Measurability ofbehavior. While 'input inadequate as measure of Performance' as a reversed scale shows the expected negative sign, the item 'exact reports available' is directly related to the BCI. Thus, the hypothesized positive impact of this construct on the use of behavior control Systems is supported by both variables in our data set.
Knowledge of Transformation process. The operationalizations of this construct consistently have signs in the hypothesized direction. In detail, the BCI diminishes as the 'complexity of products' goes up and increases with an increasing 'percentage of routine activities'. Further support is given by the consistent negative signs of 'assimilation of new hires', though this variable only has a significant impact in the logistic regression model. Thus, we find strong support for the positive role of the knowledge of the transformation process in designing behavior control Systems.
Transaction specifity. In both models, transaction specific assets do not play a significant role in the choice and design of salesforce control Systems. This finding is in accordance with the weakly or non-significant coefficients of transaction specifity reported in John and Weitz (1989) and Krafft, Lal, and Albers (1996) . Salespeople''s risk aversion. The hypothesis, that control Systems should be more behaviorbased with an increase in risk aversion of salespeople, is not supported by our data. We find two non-significant coefficients with conflicting signs in our models.
Effectiveness. The negative impact of this construct as hypothesized by Agency theory is not supported. 'Selling experience* and 'tenure' even show positive, though non-significant coefficients. Only the choice of normatively correct behavior control Systems is negatively related to increasing values of the transformed 'age' measure. Thus, we cannot Support this hypothesis.
Minimum Utility requirement.
As suggested by Agency theory, control Systems are more behavior-based the higher the minimum Utility required by the salespeople.
Usefulness of Agency Theory, Transaction Cost Analysis, and Ouchi's approach If we distinguish our findings between the theoretical approaches tested in this paper, we find strong support for Ouchi's hypotheses, that control Systems should be positively related to the inadequateness of Output as a measure of Performance and to the knowledge of the transformation process. With the exception of effectiveness, all constructs typical for Agency theory find strong support in our survey. There is also support of hypotheses derived from TCA, but the hypotheses on the impact of the two TCA specific constructs ('size of the salesforce*, 'transaction specifity') either are rejected or not supported. We feel that the limited impact of TCA variables may be a consequence of the dominant role of salary in control Systems, for which TCA shows low explanatory power, as reported in John and Weitz (1989) and Krafft, Lal, and Albers (1996) .
Impact of categories of variables
Further inspection of the results reported in Table 4 reveals, that Company variables (e.g.
'measurability of behavior', 'measurability of outcome', and 'knowledge of transformation process') have the strengest impact on the design and use of control Systems, as measured by their ß coefficients. This fmding intuitively makes sense, since these constructs are strongly related to the selling task. E.g., it seems obvious that a control system is more behavior-based, if Output measures are inadequate as Performance indicators or only available at high costs. Another interesting finding is the general support of the hypothesized positive impact of 'uncertainty" on the use of behavior-based control Systems. This is especially astonishing due to the contradictoiy findings reported in the compensation and vertical Integration literature (e.g. non significant impacts are reported in Anderson (1985) and John and Weitz (1989) , contrary findings in Coughlan and Narasimhan (1992) and Krafft, Lal, and Albers (1996) , respectively). We also feel that the limited role of salespeople variables is an interesting finding: With the exception of 'minimum Utility requirement', no single construct gets support in our survey. Thus, the design of control Systems depends much more on market conditions and the selling process than on characteristics of the salesforce.
Managerial Implications and Future Research
In this paper we report strong evidence for a salesforce control system ffamework similar to the one proposed by Anderson and Oliver (1987) . This ffamework is based on hypotheses derived from agency theory (AT), transaction cost analysis (TCA) and Ouchi's organizational approach. The descriptive power of the framework presented here is very high and lets us draw the following conclusions.
Managerial implications
Most of the companies analyzed design their control system in accordance with the theoretical approaches discussed in section 1. Sales executives who are planning to build up new sales organizations might therefore refer to the contingency hypotheses presented and discussed in this paper. Since control Systems should not be adapted after each marginal change of any contingency factor (e.g. environmental uncertainty), sales managers might also try to change the actual or perceived value of these factors. For instance, environmental uncertainty may increase and thus imply to change a rather outcome-based to a more input-based control system. But, sales managers might reduce actual uncertainty by extending a salesperson's territory or product line, thus allowing her/him to select customers or products from a wider scope. Perceived uncertainty could be reduced by Coaching and training.
It could also be shown that environmental and Company factors play a much more important role in the design of control Systems than salespeople characteristics. But, we have to qualify these findings, since they are based on the assumption that the actual design of control Systems in German sales organizations is on the whole effective and that our results are generalizable to other cultural settings etc. Nevertheless, we would argue from a darwinian perspective that all companies in our data set are still 'alive' and have to design effective control Systems in order to survive in the market (see Anderson 1988) . The similar design of control Systems in Germany and the U.S.A. is an indicator for the similarity of salesforce control in North America and Central Europe. This is also emphasized by the findings reported in Hofstede (1996) , where he shows that the U.S.A. and Germany (among other European countries) veiy often are dose to each other with regard to uncertainty avoidance, femininity/masculinity, power distance, and individualism/collectivism. Remaining differences might be accounted for by the contingency factors investigated in our framework.
Limitations and future research
The present investigation of antecedents of salesforce control Systems as well as previous empirical papers on properties and consequences of such systems assume that we are able to differentiate between causes and effects. But all papers published so far are cross-sectional and non-experimental surveys. We would therefore strongly encourage further tests of the behaviorversus outcome-based salesforce control framework with the help of longitudinal studies and experiments with sales executives. Nevertheless, we feel that the present study and the streng support of the framework are promising.
Although the hypotheses from AT, TCA, and Ouchi's approach find streng empirical support, some questions remain unsolved. Is the average practice of designing salesforce control systems in accordance with predictions from these theoretical concepts effective or not? It seems appealing to investigate the following related research questions in more detail: (1) Are hybrid systems performing better or worse than normatively correct systems? A first step has been taken by Oliver and Anderson (1995) . (2) Do firms deviating from average control systems show lower effectiveness than companies that apply control systems in accordance with industry Standards?
An approach like the one by Anderson (1988) might help in designing proper research designs.
(3) Are there other conceptual or theoretical approaches that might Supplement the framework tested in the present paper? We are looking forward to seeing more research that will help to increase our understanding of these intriguing issues. Tables   Table 1: Hypotheses 
